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ABSTRACT [Words: 150]  
 
This paper explains the extraordinary rise of the Beijing Hyundai Motor Company (BHMC), a 
joint venture between a state-owned enterprise run by the Beijing municipal government and 
Hyundai Motor Company. Within the span of three years, the BHMC soared to become China’s 
second-ranked automotive manufacturer in terms of units sold. I highlight the role of the Beijing 
municipal government in creating favourable market conditions for the BHMC during its initial 
operation phase (2002–2005). The Beijing municipal government selectively adopted 
protectionist measures and liberalising measures to promote its locally based company. I 
characterise this practice as fragmented liberalisation, a system through which sub-national 
governments discriminately apply WTO or central government regulations to promote their local 
joint venture partner. In so doing, I also challenge the existing assumption that multinational 
companies are the drivers of economic liberalisation, by showing Hyundai’s support for local 





How have China’s entry into the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the increasing market 
competition in the Chinese automotive market affected Chinese sub-national governments’ 
industrial policies? How have they influenced automotive joint ventures (JVs) between regional 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and global automakers? What operational strategies can sub-
national governments in emerging economies employ to counterbalance open market forces and 
protect local industries?  
As a latecomer to the global automotive scene, the Chinese automotive industry serves as 
an interesting case for investigating the delicate interplay of rules at the international, national, 
and sub-national levels. At the international level, China’s accession to the WTO in 2001 
reformulated the way that the country implements tariff regulations and liberalisation measures. 
The WTO compelled the Chinese central government to lift more than 7,000 trade barriers and 
pressured for increasing market access for foreign companies as well as equal treatment between 
foreign and domestic businesses. At the national level, the Chinese central government has 
consciously guided the developmental path of the automotive sector ever since it implemented 
the country’s seventh five-year plan in 1986. In recent decades, the central government has 
created a framework of market and non-market rules for sub-national governments and global 
automakers by setting ownership regulations, local content regulations, taxation policy, and 
corporate laws. At the sub-national level, provincial and municipal governments selectively 
implement WTO policies and central government regulations in ways they hope will promote a 
successful automotive industry. Fragmented and competitive dynamics are more salient in the 
automotive sector than other parts of the Chinese economy, as sub-national governments own 
automakers and attempt to create regional champions.  
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In examining the interplay of these rules in the automotive industry, I argue that China’s 
entry into the WTO ironically has empowered sub-national governments in two ways. First, it 
allows the sub-national governments to continue to pursue their own industrial policies by 
limiting the central government’s ability to implement interventionist measures at the local level. 
Second, China’s WTO membership enables sub-national governments to introduce liberalising 
measures as they see fit in order to promote their regional economic goals. I demonstrate my 
argument by examining sub-national governments’ role in creating favourable market and non-
market conditions for automotive JVs between SOEs and global automakers. Specifically, I 
perform an in-depth case study of the Beijing Hyundai Motor Company (BHMC), a JV between 
the Beijing Automotive Industry Holding Company (BAIHC)—an SOE run by the Beijing 
municipal government—and the Korean-based Hyundai Motor Company. As the first 
automotive JV in China’s post-WTO era, the BHMC exemplifies how sub-national governments 
can implement international and national regulations in ways that best promote their JV brands. 
This article explains the BHMC’s astronomical rise, as it became China’s second-largest 
automotive manufacturer in the span of three years, from 2002 to 2005. This achievement is 
astonishing given 1) Hyundai’s late entry into the Chinese market, 2) Hyundai’s initially weak 
brand recognition in China, and 3) BAIHC’s weak market position at the beginning of its JV.   
Conventional market explanations cite three factors as instrumental in the BHMC’s 
success: China’s entry into the WTO, Hyundai’s entry into the Chinese market coinciding with 
the expansion of the country’s passenger car market, and Hyundai’s management strategies. I 
find that these approaches do not adequately explain why the BHMC outperformed its 
competitors in terms of market share, given that all producers were facing the same market 
conditions. This article highlights the role the Beijing municipal government played in creating 
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favourable market conditions for the BHMC during its initial operation phase (2002–2005), the 
period when the government generally does the most to help a foreign partner settle into the 
market.  
Throughout this case study, I emphasise two main arguments. First, China’s sub-national 
governments can selectively adopt their own protectionist or liberalising measures that deviate 
from the wholesale liberalising measures that the WTO imposes on the central government. I 
characterise this practice as fragmented liberalisation, a system through which sub-national 
governments discriminately apply WTO or central government regulations to promote their local 
JV partner. Second, multinational companies are not necessarily the main drivers of economic 
liberalisation in China, as many scholars have suggested. Instead, foreign partners within sub-
national JVs foster fragmented liberalisation and often support protectionism. I begin by 
delineating the characteristics of the Chinese automotive market and explaining my theoretical 
framework of fragmented liberalisation. I then explain the BHMC’s fast growth and discuss how 
the Beijing government and its protégé, the BAIHC, selectively implemented WTO regulations 
to support the BHMC’s success within the framework of fragmented liberalisation.  
 
 
Fragmented Liberalisation: Industrial Policy beyond the Nation-State 
 
In view of its potential to create jobs and build industrial capacity, the automotive industry 
remains one of the most strategic elements of national economic development. It is not an 
overstatement to say that no country has succeeded in building an automotive industry without 
government involvement in industrial policy. China is no exception. Following the 
“Developmental State” models of Japan and South Korea, the Chinese central government set the 
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automotive sector as a pillar industry in its seventh five-year plan (1986-1990) and has guided 
the development of the industry ever since.1  
China’s automotive development, however, differs from Japan and Korea in that it 
highlights roles played by sub-national governments.2 First, Chinese bureaucratic and industrial 
structures are extremely fragmented compared to those of Japan and Korea. Historically, Mao 
Zedong’s “Self Reliance” (ziligengsheng, 自力更生) policy during the Cultural Revolution in the 
1960s implored each province to build at least one automotive factory as an import-substitution 
measure. This policy, however, failed to emphasise actual productivity or economies of scale. It 
created extremely splintered market conditions, with 130 automakers and 2,000 to 3,000 parts 
manufactures in China during the late 1980s.3 In these conditions of extensive local autonomy, 
some sub-national governments served as “local developmental states” that created regional 
champions, while other governments plunged into stagnation.4  
                                                     
1 Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1982); Alice H. 
Amsden, Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989);  
Meredith Woo-Cumings, (ed.), The Developmental State (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999). For 
automotive sector development in Japan, please see J.J. Tate, Driving Production Innovation Home: Guardian State 
Capitalism and the Competitiveness of the Japanese Automobile Industry (Berkeley, California: The Berkeley 
Roundtable on the International Economy, 1995). 
2 For more on sub-national governments’ active roles in the market, please see J. C. Oi, Rural China Takes Off: 
Institutional Foundations of Economic Reform (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999); G. Montinola, 
Y. Qian, and B.R Weingast, “Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political Basis for Economic Success in China,” World 
Politics, Vol. 48, No. 1 (1995), pp. 50–81; Jae Ho Chung, “Preferential Policies, Municipal Leadership, and 
Development Strategies,” in Jae Ho Chung (ed.), Cities in China: Recipes for Economic Development in the Reform 
Era (London: Routledge, 1999); Jae Ho Chung, Central Control and Local Discretion in China (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2000); and Chuel Cho, “한중 자동차산업정책 변천 과정의 비교와 향후 전망 [Comparing the 
Developmental Path of Auto Industry in Korea and China, and their future prospects],” Korea Institute for Industrial 
Economics and Trade (2006). 
3 For fragmented bureaucracy, see Kenneth Lieberthal and Michael Oksenberg, Policy Making in China (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988); Kenneth Lieberthal, “Introduction: The ‘Fragmented Authoritarianism’ 
Model and Its Limitations,” in K. Lieberthal and D. Lampton, et al., Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in 
Post-Mao China (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1992); Chung, Preferential Policies; and Chung, 
Central Control. 
4 Yasheng Huang, “Between Two Coordination Failures: Automotive Industrial Policy in China with a Comparison 
to Korea,” Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 9, No. 3 (2002), pp. 538-573; E. Thun, Changing Lanes 
in China: Foreign Direct Investment, Local Government, and Auto Sector Development (New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006). 
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Second, while Japan and Korea were closed to foreign automakers, China’s reform-
minded leaders, including Zhao Ziyang and Zhu Rongji, invited foreign automakers to 
consolidate the country’s fragmented and inefficient automotive industry beginning in 1984.5 To 
ensure China benefits from its relationships with MNCs, the Chinese central government 
required foreign automakers to form a JV with a maximum 50 percent of ownership to be shared 
with no more than two Chinese SOEs. Such ownership regulations not only affected the pattern 
of market competition, but also restricted global firms’ options regarding two of their most 
important business strategies—the mode and the timing of their entry into the market. Thus, the 
new tide of reform created an “obligated embeddedness” for foreign automakers, whose 
integration into the existing political and industrial structure of a given region depended partly on 
their Chinese partners’ actions.6   
Another tide of reform came with China’s entry into the WTO in 2001, which was hailed 
as a significant step forward in opening China’s market and curbing government practices that 
placed foreign firms at a competitive disadvantage. By entering the WTO, China was obliged to 
revise various regulations in compliance with WTO standards. Most significantly, the WTO’s 
Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) prevented China from implementing non-tariff 
barriers—such as export subsidies, local content requirements, and separate regulations for 
domestic and imported products [Table 1]. 
 
                                                     
5 Huang, Review of International Political Economy. 
6 Weidong Liu  and Peter Dicken, “Transnational Corporations and ‘Obligated Embeddedness’: Foreign Direct 
Investment in China’s automobile industry” Environment and Planning A, Vol. 38, No. 7 (2006), pp. 1229 – 1247; 
F.S. Sit and W. Liu, “Restructuring and Spatial Change of China’s Auto Industry under Institutional Reform and 
Globalization,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Vol. 90, No. 4 (2000), pp. 653-673. 
  
7 
Table 1. International Context: Chinese Automotive Market before and after WTO entry 
 
Policy Pre-WTO entry Post-WTO entry 
Foreign ownership Limited to 50% No change 
Number of JVs for 
foreign manufacturer 
Two per vehicle segment 





-1990s: 80-100% on passenger cars; as low 
as 9% on some other vehicles 
 
25% by 2006 
 
Import tariffs on 
vehicle components 
15-50% 10% by 2006 
Import quota 
-Varied by year, depending on number and 
value of imported vehicles 
-30,000 vehicles a year allowed from foreign 
car markers  
-$6 billion per year 
-20% annual increase until 
elimination in 2006 
Import licensing  
Foreign enterprises cannot directly import 
vehicles 
Import rights granted within 3 
years of accession 
Local content 
requirement 
-First year of production: 40% 
-Second year of production: 60% 
-Third year of production: 80%  
Elimination on accession 
Distribution, retail, 
after-sales service of 
foreign makers 
-Car manufacturers must use Chinese 
distributors to sell their vehicles, and 
domestic firms to service them 
-Limited to wholesale by JVs 
-No sales office for JVs 
Distribution, sales, and service 
rights for foreign firms phased 
in over 3 years 
 
Automotive financing Foreign non-bank financial institutions are 
prohibited from providing financing 
Foreign non-bank financial 
institutions are permitted in 
selected cities prior to gradual 
national rollout 
Source: Compiled by the author from Holweg et al. (2005) and Noble et al. (2005).  
 
Through its membership negotiations with the WTO, the Chinese central government 
maintained control over the key issues regarding Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flow in the 
automotive sector. First, ownership requirements remained intact, which heavily restricted 
foreign partners’ operational strategies by precluding them from using traditional market 
penetration tools, such as export and equity investment. Second, JV operation and key 
automotive components projects (e.g., engine motors, anti-locking breaking systems, safety 
airbags) required approval from the two most influential divisions in China’s cabinet—the State 
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Economic and Trade Commission and the State Development Planning Commission.7 In addition, 
China still assessed import tariffs—averaging 10 percent for vehicle components and 25 percent 
for assembled vehicles—even after six years from WTO membership. Assemblers and parts-
makers were prohibited from marketing their products solely under their global brand names and 
were required to stamp the name of the local manufacturer or JV partner on all their products. In 
other words, China’s central government reserved the right to assume an active role in shaping 
the developmental trajectory of the automotive sector.  
Scholars have offered many fresh insights about the negotiation process between the 
WTO and the Chinese central government, but the resilience of China’s sub-national 
governments has received less attention. Huang (2002) detailed how the Chinese central 
government introduced foreign investors to help reverse the country’s trend toward extensive 
local autonomy and regain power over the regions. Yeo and Pierson (2008) highlighted the 
central government’s efforts to keep a firm grip on the centralised regulatory structure. However, 
these approaches are relatively silent on how China’s WTO membership has affected the balance 
between national centralisation and sub-national autonomy in the country. I argue that China’s 
WTO membership has, ironically, given the country’s sub-national governments a newfound 
autonomy to selectively adopt protectionist or liberalising measures at the sub-national level.  
Under such conditions, local governments manipulate public policy to ensure favourable 
market conditions and attract foreign partners, since foreign companies can furnish SOEs (and 
thus local governments) with technology and capital. I describe this process as fragmented 
liberalisation, where sub-national governments selectively adopt measures of liberalisation and 
                                                     
7 The State Development Planning Commission was renamed as National Development and Reform Commission in 
2003. For administrative and regulatory changes in the automotive industry, see Yukyung Yeo and Margaret 




protectionism rather than wholly adopting liberalising measures imposed by the WTO on the 
central government [Figure 1]. I also argue that multinational corporations (MNCs) are not 
necessarily the main drivers of liberalisation, as many scholars have assumed.8 Instead, foreign 
JV partners have fostered fragmented liberalisation in China partly because the JV formation 
rules inevitably pit regional JVs against each other, rather than promoting competition between 
domestic firms and foreign firms. Moreover, due to Chinese sub-national governments’ 
extensive local autonomy and the law that requires foreign automakers enter into JV partnerships, 
nonmarket factors such as political bargains and coalitions at the national and sub-national levels 
have shaped China’s automotive industry.9  
 
                                                     
8 John Braithwaite and Péter Drahos, Global Business Regulation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); 
James Crotty, Gerald Epstein, and Patricia Kelly, “Multinational Corporations in the Neo-liberal Regime,” in Dean 
Baker, Gerald Epstein and Robert Pollin (ed.), Globalization and Progressive Economic Policy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998),  pp. 117–143; Kees Van der Pijl, Transnational Classes and  International 
Relations (London: Routledge, 1998); William I. Robinson and Jerry Harris, “Towards A Global Ruling Class? 
Globalization and the Transnational Capitalist Class,” Spring Vol. 64., No.1 (2000), pp. 1–54. 
9 Vinod K. Aggarwal, “Lessons from European Firm Strategies in Asia,” in Vinod K. Aggarwal (ed.), Winning in 
Asia, European Style: Market and Nonmarket Strategies for Success (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 
pp. 257-280; Vinod K. Aggarwal, “Analyzing American Firms’ Market and Nonmarket Strategies in Asia,” in 
Vinod K. Aggarwal (ed.), Winning in Asia, U.S. Style: Market and Nonmarket Strategies for Success (New York, 
NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp. 3-25; Nick Biziouras and Beverly Crawford, “The American Automobile 
industry in Asia,” in Vinod K. Aggarwal (ed,), Winning in Asia, U.S. Style: Market and Nonmarket Strategies for 
Success (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp. 95-138; Nick Biziouras and Beverly Crawford, “The Fast 
Lane to Asia: European Auto Firms in China,” in Vinod K. Aggarwal (ed,), Winning in Asia, European Style: 
Market and Nonmarket Strategies for Success (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), pp. 159-86; John 
Ravenhill, “Nonmarket Strategies in Asia: The Regional Level,” in Vinod K. Aggarwal (ed.), Winning in Asia, 








Setting the Empirical Puzzle: Navigating China at “Hyundai Speed” 
As early as 1983, automotive companies were among the first foreign investors to make inroads 
into China to vie for market share in the world’s potentially largest automotive market. However, 
not all major global automakers survived to establish a presence in the country. 10  Korea’s 
national champion, Hyundai Motor, joined other global automakers and cautiously entered China 
in April 2002. It formed a 50-50 JV with the Beijing Automotive Industry Holding Corporation 
(BAIHC), with a registered capital of 1.8 billion RMB (US $217 million). Given China’s 
proximity and market potential, Hyundai’s entry into China was surprisingly late. Nevertheless, 
the latecomer BHMC outdid most of its competitors, jumping from ranking 11th in 2003 to 2nd 
in 2005 in terms of unit sales [Table 2]. BHMC manufactured Hyundai’s best-selling car, the 
Sonata, within 64 days of opening the production line and sold 100,000 Sonatas within the first 
17 months of starting production, a feat that took Shanghai-GM 30 months. Within a year of 
starting operations, the BHMC contributed to 37 percent of Beijing’s industrial growth in 2003, 
                                                     
10 Examples include the failures Guangzhou-Peugeot in 1998 and Nanjing-Fiat in 2007. 
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in a clear contrast to Beijing’s previously failed JV with the American Motor Company (AMC), 
discussed later in this article.11 In 2003, Chinese media coined the term “Hyundai Speed” to hail 
Hyundai’s unprecedented pace of auto production and market penetration. 12  This is an 
outstanding achievement, given BHMC’s position as a latecomer in the market with weak brand 
power and BAIHC’s relatively minor position among JVs. It is also remarkable considering that 
automakers from Europe, the United States, and Japan already dominated the Chinese market 
[Table 3]. How did the BHMC speedily penetrate the Chinese market, and what unique 
characteristics contributed to BHMC’s success at “Hyundai Speed?” 
 




 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Sales Units 1,002 52,128 144,090 233,668 290,011 231,137 294,506 570,309 703,008 
Growth Rate --- 510% 176% 61% 12% 8% 12% 19% 23% 
Revenue($ Bil) --- 0.99 2.01 2.90 3.46 2.93 3.61 6.75 8.91 
Increase Rate --- --- 102 44 20 -15 23 87 32 
Ranking --- 11 5 2 5 8 9 4 4 
Source: Hyundai internal document released July 2011.  
                                                     
11 China Automotive Industry Yearbook (2004). It continuously grew to represent 570 thousand units in sales as 
well as 6.7 billion USD sales revenues in 2009. The BHMC has created an estimated 80,000 jobs since its founding 
up until 2010 (7,350 in BHMC and 70,000 in related parts companies). 
12  Xiyou He, “Interaction between Transnational Corporations and Industry Clusters in China: The Case of 
Automobile Industry,” in Akifumi Kuchiki and Masatsugu Tsuji (ed.), The Formation of Industrial Clusters in Asia 
and Regional Integration (Japan: Institute of Developing Economies, 2008); Beijing Youth Daily (北京青年报). 现
代速度拉动北京经济, 2003年10月20日http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20031020/0432480994.shtml.  
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Table 3. China’s Major JV Automotive Assemblers in 2007 
Start of production Enterprise Local Partner Model 
1984 Jeep (American Motor) Beijing Cherokee, Grand Cherokee 
1985 Volkswagen Shanghai Santana, Passat, Polo 
1991 Suzuki Chang’an Alto, Cultus 
1991 Volkswagen First Auto Works Jetta, Audi, Bora, Golf 
1992 Citroen Shenlong (Dongfeng) Citroen ZX, Picasso 
1996 Nissan Dongfeng Bluebird, Teana 
1997 General Motors Shanghai Buick, Sail 
1998 Honda Guangzhou Accord, Fit 
1999 Kia Dongfeng Yueda Pride, Qianlima 
1999 General Motors  Jinbei GR8 
1999 Fiat Nanjing Paleo, Siena 
2000 Toyota Tianjin FAW Corolla, Vios 
2001 Ford  Chang’an   Fiesta, Mondeo, Focus 
2002 Hyundai  Beijing Sonata, Elantra 
2003 Honda Dongfeng CR-V 
2004 Benz-DaimlerChrysler Beijing Mercedes Benz 
2004 Toyota Guangzhou Camry 
2007 Daimler  Fujian Mercedes-Benz Viano, Vito, SPV 
Source: Compiled by the author from press releases and company websites, and automotive industry yearbooks 
 
Conventional market-oriented explanations cite three factors as instrumental in 
Hyundai’s success in China. The first factor is Hyundai’s opportune timing of market entry in 
2002, when the demand for passenger vehicles took off in China. However, this does not explain 
how the growing demand for passenger cars translated into the demand for Hyundai cars. The 
second factor is Hyundai’s global management experience and operating strategies from its 
previous ventures in emerging countries like India.13 However, instead operating as a wholly 
                                                     
13 Jang-Rho Lee, Jay-Hyuk Rhee, Choon-su Lee, Mi-Ok Kim, “북경현대차의 중국시장 마케팅 전략: 쏘나타 
브랜드를 사례 중심으로 (Marketing Strategy of Beijing-Hyundai Motor Company in Chinese Market-Focused on 
‘Sonata’ Brand Case),” International Regional Academic Conference (2007c); Christophe Wright, Suh Chung-Sok, 
and Christopher Leggett, “If at First You Don’t Succeed: Globalized Production and Organizational Learning at the 
Hyundai Motor Company,” Asia Pacific Business Review, Vol. 15, No. 2 (2009), pp. 163-180; Jae Chan Park and 
Dong Sung Cho, “현대자동차의 중국 자동차 시장 진출: 북경현대 기차를 중심으로 (Hyundai Motor’s Entry 
into Chinese Auto Market: the Case Study of Beijing Hyundai),” 한국국제경영학회 (International Business 
Management of Korea) (2010), pp. 73-93.; Jang-Rho Lee, Jay-Hyuk Rhee, Jihoon Oar, So yeon Kim, “A Case Study 
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owned enterprise—as Hyundai does in India and the United States—Hyundai operates in China 
as a JV with a Chinese SOE.14 The third factor is China’s entry into the WTO in 2001, which 
subsequently curbed government practices that put foreign firms at a competitive disadvantage.15 
Yet this does not adequately explain why the BHMC outperformed its competitors in terms of 
market share, given that all producers were facing the same market conditions. Overall, market 
explanations fail to capture how the locus of industrial policy often lies in the hands of sub-
national governments and how China’s entry into the WTO opened the door for sub-national 
governments to adopt protectionist and liberalising measures.16  
Recognising the politicised nature of the automotive sector, Thun (2006) explains 
BHMC’s success by pointing to Beijing’s prior experience with the AMC. He argues that the 
failure with the AMC prompted Beijing’s leadership to develop new political and economic 
incentives vis-à-vis its new JV partner, Hyundai, and to undertake a laissez-faire approach by 
granting Hyundai huge leeway in its operations. However, Thun’s approach misses the dynamics 
of how sub-national governments have found ways to continue local protectionism even after 
China entered the WTO and how sub-national governments strategically choose to use 
liberalising schemes. In other words, Beijing’s laissez-faire approach to Hyundai is not the result 
of incapacity as Thun suggests, but the result of strategic choice.  
                                                                                                                                                                           
on Establishment and Partner Strategy of Beijing-Hyundai [북경현대 중국합작 회사설립 및 파트너 전략에 관한 
사례연구],”  International Trade Research, Vol. 12, No. 1 (2007a), pp. 201-228; Jang-Rho Lee, Jay-Hyuk Rhee,  
Chun-Su Lee, “A Case Study on Beijing-Hyundai Motor Company’s Productions and Sourcing strategy [북경현대 
자동차의 생산, 구매에 관한 사례연구],” International Management Reviews, Vol. 10, No. 3 (2007b), pp. 49-73; 
M. Wright, 2005. “Strategy research in emerging economies: challenging the conventional Wisdom,” in Jo 
Brudenell, et al. (ed.),  Journal of Management Studies, Vol. 42, No. 1 (2005), pp. 1–33.  
14 Chuel Cho, “Globalization Experiences of Korean Automotive Industry and Implication for China,” Korea  
Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade (2008).  
15  G. Noble, John Ravenhill, and Richard F. Doner, “Executioner or Disciplinarian: WTO Accession and the 
Chinese Auto Industry,” Business and Politics, Vol. 7, No. 2 (2005). 
16 Nick Biziouras and Beverly Crawford , “The American Automobile industry in Asia,” in Vinod Aggarwal (ed.), 
Winning in Asia, U.S. Style: Market and Nonmarket Strategies for Success (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2003),  pp. 95-138; Harry G.  Broadman, “A Litmus Test for China’s Accession to the WTO: Reform of its State-
Owned Enterprises,” in Sylvia Ostry, Alan S. Alexandroff, and Rafael Gomez (ed.), China and the Long March to 
Global Trade: the Accession of China to the World Trade Organization (London: Routledge, 2002). 
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Explaining BHMC’s Success: Fragmented Liberalisation at the Sub-National Level 
China’s de facto decentralisation has enabled the country’s sub-national governments to play a 
major role in enforcing WTO rules and the Chinese central government’s regulations.17 The 
Beijing municipal government was especially proactive in supporting BHMC as a way to revamp 
its automotive industry. To better understand how the Beijing government and its protégé SOE 
(BAIHC) assisted BHMC’s development, it is important to first explore the history of the 
BAIHC and the formation of its partnership with Hyundai. 
 Established in 1958 as a SOE of the Beijing municipal government, the BAIHC reigned 
as one of China’s leading light truck producers. The BAIHC became a pioneer in 1983 by 
forming China’s first JV, Beijing Jeep Corporation (BJC), with the AMC to produce the Jeep 
Cherokee for the Chinese market.18 However, without any precedents to serve as guidance, this 
JV soon failed and became “a symbol of conflicting interests, hidden charges, 
miscommunication and an unattained goal.”19 The BJC failed to target the mass market for its 
sports utility vehicles and struggled through the 1990s, producing only 15,000 to 20,000 vehicles.  
 With BJC, the Beijing city government and the BAIHC displayed weak leadership by 
failing to aggressively promote Jeep sales or adeptly manage BAIHC’s fragmented 
organisational structure.20 Instead, they followed an import-substitution strategy by pressing the 
AMC to follow local content regulations and to build indigenous parts suppliers. However, the 
AMC was more interested in importing a complete kit containing the parts needed to assemble a 
                                                     
17 For decentralization and fragmented bureaucracy, see Liberthal and Oksenberg, Policy Making in China , 
Liberthal  Introduction, Chung, Preferential Policies; Chung, Central Control; and Yongnian Zheng, De Facto 
Federalism in China: Reforms and Dynamics of Central-Local Relations (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing 
Co., 2007).  
18 In 1983, the BJC signed a 20-year contract and owned registered capital of 51.03 million RMB that 68.65% were 
held by BAIHC and 31.35% by American Motor Company. 
19 Noble et al., Business and Politics, pp.5. 
20 Interview with a former manager at BAIHC-Foton in Beijing (June 21, 2009); Keun Lee, Chinese Firms and the 
State in Transition: Property Rights and Agency Problems in the Reform Era (Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe Inc., 1991); 
and Thun, Changing Lanes. 
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vehicle—complete knock-down. 21  It informally changed the requirements of local content 
without properly executing written contracts. Beijing’s underdeveloped heavy industry base and 
the scarce number of Chinese parts suppliers further complicated the enforcement of local 
content regulations.22 The BJC struggled in providing the minimum wage requirements for its 
employees, and its contributions to the local economy were meagre.23 
  Despite being China’s mecca of politics and culture, Beijing was unable to match 
Guangdong and Shanghai in terms of industrial development. The failure was particularly bitter 
for Beijing’s city leaders since Beijing had several features that were conducive to the growth of 
future passenger vehicle market—including a topography of plains and plateaus, the highest 
number of driver’s license holders in China, and a 100 percent increase in GDP during the late 
1990s. Beijing also represented a large segment of corporate and government demand for 
automobiles, accounting for 15 percent of total automotive consumption in China during that 
period.24  
 To rejuvenate the anaemic BAIHC, the Chinese central government considered merging it 
with a central government–owned automaker, First Auto Works (FAW).25 Immediately prior to 
the merger, the Beijing leadership desperately sought a different partner to revamp the BAIHC 
and help it obtain a share of the fast-growing passenger car market. However, due to a Chinese 
government restriction that all foreign automakers were limited to a maximum of two JVs, 
                                                     
21 Eric Harwit, China’s Automobile Industry: Policies, Problems, and Prospects (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995) 
and Jim  Mann, Beijing JEEP: A Case Study of Western Business in China (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 
1997).   
22 For details of BJC, see Harwit, China’s Automobile Industry and James Mann, Beijing JEEP: A Case Study of 
Western Business in China (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997). 
23 The BAIHC and the AMC agreed in September 2000 to inject $226 million and extend its term by 30 years to 
2033. See Eric Harwit, “The Impact of WTO Membership on the Automobile Industry in China,” The China 
Quarterly, Vol. 167 (2001), pp. 655-670. 
24 Korean Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade (2009). 
25  Interview with a manager in Hyundai’s Beijing office (November 28, 2010); Interview with a company 
spokesman, Hyundai Motor headquarters in Seoul, Korea (December 2, 2010).  
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Beijing found its options for a JV partner limited to Hyundai and Toyota. Hyundai appeared to 
be the perfect partner for targeting China’s booming middle class with its mid-sized sedans (e.g., 
Sonata and Avante XD). 
The timing of Beijing’s invitation could not have been more serendipitous for Hyundai, 
because the company was looking to enter the Chinese market as part of its global strategy. 
Despite the geographic proximity between Korea and China as well as China’s market potential, 
Hyundai had delayed its entry because of China’s protected market environment, strict 
regulations on foreign partners, and the weak management of most existing Chinese enterprises. 
Toyota’s failed bid with the Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (SAIC) in the mid-1990s 
and Peugeot’s failure with the Guangzhou Automotive Industry Corporation in 1997 served as 
further deterrents. Somewhat dubious of its chances in China in light of these many obstacles, 
Hyundai instead elected to expand in other emerging markets like Turkey (1993) and India 
(1996), with ambitions of becoming the world’s fifth-largest automaker by 2010.26 
Though temporarily routing its capital elsewhere, Hyundai maintained its interest in 
China and signed a $6 million contract in September 1994 with the Wuhan Wantong Automotive 
Company to launch a knock-down assembly factory for mini-bus production. However, China’s 
numerous trade barriers on automotive imports limited Hyundai’s exports to China to less than 
10,000 automobiles per year.27 To buttress its China operation, Hyundai sought a politically 
strong and adequately capitalised partner like BAIHC that could 1) mitigate concerns about 
unpredictability of the Chinese market; 2) offer strong bargaining power vis-à-vis the central 
government; and 3) help overcome the disadvantages of late entry into the market.28  
                                                     
26 Interview with a researcher at Korea Automotive Research Institute in Seoul, Korea (December 12, 2010). 
27 Interview with a manager in Hyundai’s Beijing office (June 27, 2009).  
28 Choosing Beijing as JV partner also enabled Hyundai to avoid overlapping of markets with its other brand in 
Wuhan— Kia. Kia Motor set up a 50:50 JV with the Yueda group in 1997. After Hyundai Motor’ acquisition of Kia 
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Micro-level Opportunity: BAIHC’s Failure and Revamped Partnership Choice 
The failure of the BJC and the rumoured merger between the BAIHC and FAW compelled 
Beijing’s municipal leadership to dedicate itself to the success of a second partnership and ask 
for support from the central government. The central government opted to revamp Beijing’s 
ailing automotive industry by cancelling BAIHC’s merger with FAW and participating in all 
stages of Beijing’s partnership with Hyundai, from initial negotiations throughout the final 
approval stage. In April 2001, Vice Premier of State Council, Wu Bangguo, organised a meeting 
in Beijing between Jung Monggu, Hyundai’s president, and Jia Qinglin, Secretary of the 
Communist Party of China Beijing Municipal Committee and a member of the Political Bureau 
of the Central Committee.29 Their prompt negotiation to establish a thirty-year contract JV was 
astonishing compared to SAIC–Volkswagen’s four years of preparatory meetings.30 The building 
of Hyundai’s factory and start-up of operations followed at similarly unprecedented speed.  
Following the central government’s initiative, the Beijing municipal leadership 
endeavoured to expedite the actualisation of the JV. In May 2002, the Beijing Party Secretary 
directed the Hyundai project task force team (qichegongyelingdaoxiaozu, 汽车工业领导小组) 
chaired by Beijing Mayor Liu Qi to expedite administrative procedures and grant the requisite 
approval for BHMC to commence operations.31 In addition, Beijing’s Development and Reform 
Commission provided extensive support for land purchases, infrastructure development, and 
personnel hiring. Hyundai purchased the Beijing Qingxing Light Truck Automobile factory in 
Shunyi—1,800 thousand acres of land and infrastructure valued at 160 billion RMB—at a 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Motor, Hyundai acquired 20 % share of Yueda Kia in September 2000. In March 2002, Hyundai, Kia, Dongfeng and 
the Yueda group agreed to set up a new JV–Dongfeng Yueda Kia Motor with 50% share on Kia and 25% each for 
Yueda and Dongfeng.  
29 Interview with a former manager at Hyundai’s Beijing office and current manager at Korean office in Korea  
(December 14, 2009).  
30 Interview with a manager at German supplier company in Shanghai (September 14, 2009).  




reduced price of 50 billion RMB. 32  Hyundai also received assistance in recruiting China’s 
advanced engineers and skilled technicians.33 Such preferential treatment towards JVs is not an 
unusual occurrence, but the degree to which Beijing assisted Hyundai is notable when juxtaposed 
to its prior relationship with the AMC. This increased government support enabled the BHMC to 
begin construction quickly in June 2002 and produce its first model within 65 days [Table 4]. 
The remarkable speed of Hyundai’s operation is more apparent when comparing it with Toyota’s 
JV experience with Tianjin Automotive Company—an ordeal that lasted more than seven years 
from initial negotiations to production.34 
Beijing’s municipal leadership adopted two additional measures to help Hyundai settle in 
the Chinese market. The first measure involved protectionism—promoting Hyundai’s model for 
Beijing’s taxi fleet change preceding the 2008 Beijing Olympics. This case demonstrates that 
China’s entry into the WTO has not prevented sub-national governments from navigating 
through WTO regulation loopholes to continue local protectionism. The second measure was 
more of a liberalising move—allowing Hyundai to transplant its suppliers from Korea to China 
and abandoning the goal of developing indigenous companies. This was possible due to China’s 
elimination of local content requirements under the WTO’s Trade-Related Investment Measures 
(TRIMs). 
                                                     
32 Interview with a manager in Hyundai’s Beijing office (June 27, 2009); Interview with a researcher at Korea 
automotive research Institute in Seoul, Korea (December 7, 2009).  
33 Interview with an academic researcher at a university in Beijing (March 31, 2009). 
34 Interview with an executive at Toyota in Guangzhou (May 23, 2010).  
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Table 4. Beijing-Hyundai Motor Company  
2001 April Wu Bangguo arranged a meeting between Jia Qinglin and Jung Monggu 
2002 May JV contract was signed 
June Beijing government set up the task force team with Beijing Mayor Liu Qi as Chair  
 BAIHC and five shareholders collaboratively set up Beijing Auto Investment  
July National Economic and Trade Commission requested China International 
Consulting Corporation to evaluate BHMC project and affirmed the basic outline 
for BHMC project in principle 
August Beijing Mayor Liu Qi and Beijing Party Secretariat Jia Qinglin visited BHMC 
September BHMC received approval from State Development Planning Commission 
October BHMC established 
December BHMC started production and sales of Sonata, and started constructing the engine 
factory 
2003 March  BHMC achieved 40% local content for EF Sonata 
December BHMC produced and sold more than 50,000 cars over the course of 2003 
2004 January BHMC started sales of Elantra (Avante XD: yilante伊兰特)  
December BHMC sold more than 100,000 Elantras over the course of 2004, which was 
selected as the most ideal car for Chinese family 
2005 January   Hyundai adopted as model for Beijing taxi fleet prior to 2008 Olympics 
   BHMC completed enhancing production capability for an extra 300,000 cars 
2006 March BHMC introduced Accent (Korean model name Verna) 
2007 September BHMC established the Second Engine Factory 
 December BHMC produced more than 1 million engines 
2008 February Production and sales exceeded 1 million units 
 April BHMC completed its second factory 
2010 December BHMC started the construction of its third factory 
Source: Compiled by the author from various sources.35 
 
Local Protectionism with Beijing’s Characteristics: Taxi-Changing Plan 
In addition to providing Hyundai with administrative support, the Beijing leadership decided to 
follow other regional JVs’ pattern for success by using internal protectionism to favour locally 
produced goods and locally based companies. In the automotive sector, several cases have shown 
that regional protectionism is conducive to JV success.36  SAIC-Volkswagen and Dongfeng-
Citroen in Wuhan strongly encouraged local goods and companies. When SAIC-Volkswagen 
started operations in 1985, the Shanghai government not only purchased much of the output for 
                                                     
35 The History of Beijing’s Auto Industry and Beijing Hyundai (Beijingqichegongyeshizhibeijinghyundai; 北京汽车
工业史之北京现代), 网易汽车综合,(2010-04-17). http://auto.163.com/10/0417/14/64FT9EV800084BIC.html. 




government use (including as taxis and municipal vehicles), but also assessed a surcharge on 
sales to support a new fund for local parts supplier development.37   
 In similar fashion, sub-national governments devised various ways to directly and 
indirectly manipulate consumer purchases and thereby promote locally based JVs. In the 1990s, 
the Shanghai government charged a 10,000 RMB ($1,500) license fee for its JV partner 
Volkswagen’s products while charging 80,000 to 100,000 RMB ($12,000) for other vehicle 
models.38 As a result, Volkswagen seized half of the Chinese market for passenger cars.  In 1999, 
the city of Wuhan in Hubei province granted special tax relief to residents who purchased locally 
made Citroen-Fukang models while imposing surcharge of up to 70,000 RMB ($8,400) to those 
who purchased non-Fukang cars.39 SAIC-Volkswagen models, for example, cost twice as much 
in Hubei province because of government-imposed “Relief Fund for Enterprises in Great 
Difficulty (tekunqiyejiekunjijin 特困企业解困基金).” 40  Such non-tariff barriers of local 
protectionism were prevalent in the 1990s.  
Under such circumstances, the Beijing municipal government and the BAIHC wanted to 
follow Shanghai and Wuhan’s success in using internal protection to create favourable market 
conditions for Hyundai. The Beijing government’s commitment to support BHMC was apparent 
from the very first month of Sonata’s production in December 2002, when the Beijing 
government purchased all 2,000 units produced— taxi companies, the Beijing city government, 
and the police purchasing 600, 500, and 300 units, respectively. Another sign of Beijing’s 
commitment came during the city’s taxi fleet change prior to hosting the 2008 Olympic Games. 
                                                     
37 Ibid, (2006). 
38 Interview with an academic researcher at a university in Shanghai (May 9, 2009).  
39 Interview with an academic researcher at a university in Shanghai (May 16, 2009).  
40 Dongha Kim, “WTO 가입이후 중국의 지방보호주의 여전” (Chinese Regional Protectionism in the Post WTO 
era), Chindia Journal (POSCO Research Institute, 2006). 
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By 2002, a majority of taxis operating in Beijing—including Tianjin Xiali, Citroen Fukang, and 
Volkswagen Jetta—had reached the end of their six-year life spans. Expecting increased tourism 
and media coverage, the municipal government mandated that all 70,000 of the city’s taxis be 
replaced by 2007, with a renewal rate of 20 to 30 percent a year. The announcement spurred 
major automobile makers to vie for the largest taxi market in China, accounting for 8 percent of 
the country’s 780,000 taxis as of 2002.41  
 The Beijing municipal government recognised the taxi renewal mandate as a propitious 
opportunity for Hyundai’s launch in China. Even before Sonata’s debut in the market, Liang 
Jianwei, the director of the Taxi Management Division under the Beijing Communication Bureau, 
announced the mid-sized Hyundai Sonata as the government’s first choice for its standard taxi 
model.42 Such official remarks revealed Beijing’s preference for Hyundai models and signalled 
new competition for domestic automakers. Liang’s statement provoked fierce objections and 
sparked controversy among other automakers. Ultimately, the Taxi Management Division was 
commissioned to draft a new standard for taxi models that would not restrict vehicle brands. All 
vehicle makers and models were to have equal opportunity to enter the taxi market so long as 
they satisfied government standards. However, the government still maintained considerable 
leeway to manipulate these supposed standards.43 
 The 1,500 existing taxi companies in Beijing were free to choose any of the approved 
models. As a result, major competitors lobbied taxi operators to purchase their models. Chery 
                                                     
41 Only in 2001, the fleet hauled 540 million passengers, and sported operating income of 8.17 billion RMB, equal to 
a fifth of the city government’s operating budget.  
42 “Taxi Officials on Song for Hyundai’s Sonata,” Beijing This Month (August 1, 2002), 
http://www.btmbeijing.com/contents/en/btm/2002-08/whathot/taxi. 
43 The final standards include engine displacement lower than 1.8 litre，price no higher than 150,000RMB，the 
length of the car no less than 4.5 meter，and a fully equipped GPS system. Cars that meet government standards 
included BHMC Sonata, FAW Redflag, Audi and Cherry’s Eastar, and SAIC-Volkswagen Santana 3000. The cars 
that received good appraisal in the Beijing market of FAW’ Jetta and already used taxi Fukang were excluded based 
on such standard (Economic Daily News, August 7, 2001). http://auto.sina.com.cn/news/2001-08-07/12418.shtml 
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Automobile—based in Wuhu, Anhui province—arranged holiday tours for Beijing drivers in 
Wuhu in mid-September 2002 to feature its Eastar model. SAIC-Volkswagen unveiled the new 
Santana 3000 model at the Beijing Auto Show and heavily promoted its in-car equipment, 
including an updated global positioning system. Even with these added features, the Santana 
3000 was marketed at 30,000 RMB less than the retail price of a Sonata. SAIC–Volkswagen 
promoted excursions for Beijing taxi companies to visit Shanghai and other cities where Santana 
3000 were widely deployed as taxis.44 Li Hongbao, an official with SAIC-Volkswagen’s north 
China sales and service centre, disclosed that some carmakers paid for leaders of Beijing taxi 
companies to travel to the 2004 Olympic Games in Athens.45 However, a number of Beijing taxi 
firms were not able to “freely” choose what model they wanted because the municipal 
government controlled their management licenses. Ongoing internal debates hampered the 
Beijing government for more than two years following the announcement of the updated taxi 
standard.46 
Eventually, the Beijing municipal government and the BAIHC abandoned their plans to 
choose only the Sonata for Beijing taxis. From 2005 to 2007, Beijing adopted Hyundai models 
for 60.51 percent of its taxi fleet change, which amounted to 34,251 units. Although the use of 
the Hyundai model for taxis did not directly influence consumer purchases, the increased 
exposure of Hyundai vehicles affirmed its position in the Chinese market and demonstrated the 
Beijing leadership’s commitment to support BHMC. Other JVs cannot criticise such local 
protectionist schemes, except through informal lobbying. Executives from other JVs commented 
                                                     
44 Wu Zhong, Carmakers hail new taxi fleet for Beijing,” The Standard (October 7, 2004) 
http://www.thestandard.com.hk/news_detail.asp?pp_cat=&art_id=11047&sid=&con_type=1&d_str=20041007&isS
earch=1&sear_year=2004. 
45 Interview with academic researcher at a university in Beijing (March 31, 2009); Interview with an academic 
researcher at a university in Shanghai (September 16, 2009).  
46 Interview with a researcher at a Chinese research center (April 4, 2009).  
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that since most JVs have relied on similar strategies, they could not really criticize Beijing’s 
practices.47 
I argue that Beijing’s policy of supporting locally produced vehicles demonstrates how 
sub-national governments selectively apply national regulations at the sub-national level and 
navigate through possible loopholes in WTO regulations [Figure 2]. At the international level, 
TRIMs and the WTO’s non-discrimination principle (Article III:4 of GATT) do not speak 
directly to local protectionism. According to those rules, China cannot maintain separate 
regulations for domestic and imported products once foreign goods are in the Chinese market. 
However, the rules do not directly control cases where high intra-national barriers (rather than 
inter-national barriers) hamper the entry of non-Beijing goods into the Beijing market. At the 
national level, the central government has enacted several legal provisions to combat regional 
protectionism and anti-competitive behaviour since 1980. Most recently, in 2003, nine 
government bodies—including the Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Transportation, State 
Administration of Taxation, and State Administration for Industry and Commerce—collectively 
issued “Guidelines for Special Rectification of the Automotive Market” to counterbalance local 
protectionism in the automotive industry. However, the central government often turns a blind 
eye to the implementation of such legal provisions, in order to support the development of 
certain local industries or does not have the capacity to implement nationwide regulations. 
Ultimately, Beijing’s municipal government was able to get away with implementing partial 
local protectionism for Hyundai in its own city. By proactively opening the city’s taxi market to 
the BHMC, Beijing’s leadership protected its preferred local firm from competing JVs and 
manipulated the domestic distribution of vehicles.  
                                                     
47 Interview with exectuives from two different JVs, one in Tianjin and one in Shanghai (September 14, 2009; June 
5th, 2010).  
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The promotion of locally made goods is not only in the regional government’s interest, 
but also in the foreign partner’s interest. Hyundai had internal debates over using Sonata as a taxi 
fleet vehicle, worrying about the depreciation of its brand image.48 Yet it came to an agreement 
to support the taxi fleet upgrade plan and became one of the major beneficiaries of tacit 
protectionism and fragmented liberalisation in China. China’s distinctive pattern of encouraging 
intra-national competition between regional JVs rather than competition between foreign and 
domestic companies motivates foreign companies to support protectionism rather than pushing 
for further economic liberalisation.  
Beijing’s taxi fleet change is an especially significant example, since China has not 
signed the WTO’s Government Procurement Agreement (GPA), which would open the door for 
fair competition when foreign companies bid to supply goods and services to China’s 
government. More than two-thirds of American states and all sub-central entities in the European 
Union are covered under the GPA. Given that government procurement accounts for about 10 to 
15 percent of GDP in most countries, China’s refusal to sign the GPA provides huge leeway for 
the country’s sub-national governments to create arrangements that serve their own interests. The 
United States and other GPA parties have demanded that China include sub-national entities and 
certain SOEs in China’s GPA, but these demands have not included SOEs in purely commercial 
activities––such as automakers.49 Therefore, the automotive industry will not be included in the 
GPA even after China signs it, and regional governments will maintain significant leeway in 
their dealings with automakers. 
                                                     
48 Interview with a manager in Hyundai’s Beijing office (June 27, 2009); Interview with a researcher at Korea 
automotive research Institute, Seoul, Korea (December 7, 2009); Interview with a Company spokesman, Hyundai 
motor headquarter in Seoul, Korea (December 14, 2009).  
49 Demetrios Marantis, “The WTO Government Procurement Agreement: A Tremendous Opportunity for China.” 





Figure 2. China’s Local Protectionism since Joining the WTO 
 
  
Macro-Level Opportunity: WTO Membership and Bandwagoning to Hyundai’s Supplier Networks 
BHMC’s supplier network development and sourcing strategy allow us to examine how WTO 
membership has changed conditions in China, sometimes in unexpected ways. Developing 
countries tend to use local content requirements as non-tariff barriers and follow an import-
substitution strategy by requiring foreign companies to purchase or use inputs of domestic origin. 
International organisations, particularly the WTO, have strongly attacked these policies because 
it creates barriers for operations of foreign businesses, but policy makers in developing countries 
continue to be firm believers in their potential benefits. In the automotive industry, success 
largely depends on developing a broad network of firms and suppliers. One automobile consists 
of more than 20,000 parts, and 70 percent of a car’s value-added lies in components, compared 
to only 10 to 15 percent in assembly. Recognizing the importance of developing indigenous parts 
suppliers, the Chinese central government implemented a schedule of strict local content 
requirements as early as the 1980s. Under this arrangement, each JV faces severe penalties if it 
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does not meet a localisation content rate of 40 percent in the first year of production, 60 percent 
in the second year, and 80 percent by the third year. However, the drive for quick localisation 
and utilisation of Chinese parts has often hampered the level of vehicle quality and the overall 
health of JVs, as illustrated in the case of BJC, the arrangement between Beijing’s SOE 
(BAIHC) and the AMC.  
Based on its experience with BJC, the BAIHC painstakingly learned about the drawbacks 
of strict local content regulations, and thus shifted strategies to grant Hyundai greater autonomy 
to organise local supplier networks. In practice, this meant bypassing indigenous firms that had 
been the focus of earlier development efforts in favour of suppliers from other regions or from 
the foreign partner’s home country. Utilizing outside resources is more effective than adopting 
the institutional changes involved in cultivating similar resources at home. The BAIHC opted to 
rely initially on Hyundai’s existing Korean-based supplier networks in order to expedite 
Hyundai’s adjustment to China, avoiding the weaknesses in BAIHC’s fragmented intra-firm 
structure. The BAIHC was able to take this course of action without receiving much political 
criticism for abandoning the goal of developing indigenous companies, because the WTO’s 
TRIMs and GATT Article XI: 1 allowed for the elimination of local content requirements. The 
removal of these requirements allows companies to make parts-sourcing strategy decisions based 








Despite the removal of local content requirements, Hyundai achieved 68 percent 
localisation by the end of 2003, which increased to 96 percent by the end of 2009 [Table 5]. It is 
important to note, however, that this increasing localisation reflects the increasing presence of 
Korean suppliers operating in China rather than parts produced by indigenous Chinese 
companies. For example, Hyundai brought its most important subsidiary, Hyundai Mobis 
Automotive Parts Company, to China, and Mobis established five manufacturing operations in 
Beijing, Shanghai, and Jiangsu to supply the BHMC with 100 percent of the Sonata’s core parts. 
50 Mobis’s presence in China not only contributed greatly to the high localisation rate without 
impairing parts quality, but also enabled Hyundai to establish a strong modular operation in 
order to reduce production cost. This arrangement generated profits within Hyundai group 
without ensuring much profit sharing for the BAIHC. Given Hyundai’s intimate working 
relationships between assemblers and suppliers in Korea, receiving permission to replicate home 
supplier networks was a significant factor in the company’s ability to expedite its adjustment in 
China without compromising quality.  
                                                     
50 Mobis has 31 second-tier suppliers, 95 % of whom are Korean companies in China. 
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Sourcing from Mobis also satisfies political needs in Hyundai Motor’s business 
operations.  The president of Hyundai Motor, Jung Monggu, owns more shares in Mobis than in 
Hyundai, which strengthens Mobis’ influence on Hyundai’s sourcing decisions. 51  This 
arrangement is different from the case with General Motors, which has an arms-length 
relationship with its supplier firms. GM does not restrict its sourcing to Delphi, a GM-spinoff 
supplier company that is now an independent firm. However, the relationship between Hyundai 
Motor and Mobis creates an obligation for Hyundai to use its parts-producing subsidiaries 
instead of focusing on Chinese partners’ in-group suppliers.52 
                                                     
51 For example, the President of Hyundai Motor, Jung Monggu, owns 7.9% of Hyundai Mobis and 5.2% of Hyundai 
Motor. And, Hyundai Mobis owns 20.78% of Hyundai Motor.  
52 For more details, please see John Ravenhill, “From National Champions to Global Partnerships: The Korean Auto 
Industry, Financial Crisis and Globalization.” MIT Japan Program. (2001) Working Paper 01.04;Korean Institute 
for Industrial Economics and Trade (Beijing Office) “Present and Future direction of development of Korean auto 
companies in China [중국진출 한국자동차 업체의 현황과 발전방향], China Industry Briefing [중국 산업 
브리핑] (2008), pp. 08-25; L. Shridharan,  Industry and Corporate Competitiveness: The Auto Parts Industry in 
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Audio, tire wheel, battery, 
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Total 57  
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Automatic transmission, 
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Source: Hyundai internal documents (2003). 
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On a Same Bed Yet Different Dreams: Increasing Tension over Sourcing in the Second 
Phase of JV Operation  
 
The Beijing municipal government’s use of protectionist measures in its taxi procurement and 
liberalising measures in its supplier network development contributed to BHMC’s “success at 
Hyundai speed” in the Chinese market. Yet such arrangements tilt the balance of power between 
JV partners in favour of the foreign partner as the JV operation matures. A foreign partner’s 
increasing power in JV operations is almost inevitable in view of the foreign company’s control 
over sales, purchasing, technology transfer, and production and quality control. Better 
management skills, more competitive models, and pricing and creative marketing strategies have 
become increasingly indispensable in strengthening a JV’s position among the fierce competition 
of the world’s largest automotive market. Competitive market forces have pressured global 
automakers to introduce updated technology and models in China in a timely fashion.  
Meanwhile, the Chinese partner in an automobile JV typically contributes less effort 
towards developing its own products, but fully shares in the benefits of increased market sales. 
However, the asymmetrical power distribution within the JV has created a sense of crisis for 
SOEs as they are squeezed by economic forces from above and below. From above, the central 
government has heavily criticised SOEs for staggering behind foreign competitors and failing to 
develop national or regional champions of independent models after two decades of government 
support. From below, private Chinese automakers like BYD and Geely have fared well with their 
indigenous models.53 The BAIHC lies at the centre of attention partly due to its close proximity 
to the central government. In response to bureaucratic pressure, the BAIHC has strived to 
                                                     
53 Acknowledging the failure of “exchanging the Chinese market with technology (以市场换技术)” policy, the 
National Development and Reform Commission in turn enacted the “Policy for the Development of the Automotive 
Industry” in 2004. The new policy abandoned heavy JV regulation and instead encouraged self-reliant product and 
local brand development. The approach aimed to launch globally competitive automotive groups that reinforce 




develop its independent models and parts companies. This effort has bred increasing tension 
between the JV partners concerning BHMC’s sourcing strategy, as more than 90 percent of parts 
are supplied by Hyundai’s suppliers.54 Given that 70 percent of a vehicle’s total value consists of 
the cost of parts, the BAIHC was concerned that Hyundai would gain a majority of the JV’s 
profit. Annual decreases in vehicle retail prices of 7 to10 percent heightened the BAIHC’s 
apprehension, as it could lose more revenue through this depreciation. 55  
Such tension prompted the leaders of the BAIHC and Hyundai to cease major corporate 
decisions for the 2007-2008 fiscal year.56 This blew a brutal hit in their partnership as 50:50 JV 
formation requires consensus from both sides for important decisions over management, 
personnel and investment. The BAIHC even established its own parts company called Beijing 
Hainachuan in August 2007. 57  The intense internal conflicts reflected directly on BHMC’s 
market performance in 2007 and 2008, when it plummeted from 2nd to 9th in terms of unit sales in 
China. Facing this economic downturn, both JV partners realised the damaging results of arguing 
over localisation and sourcing. In early 2009, both partners acknowledged the integral role each 
plays in the successful maintenance of JV operations. For the Beijing city government, the 
BHMC helps propel the economy, especially after the Beijing Capital Iron and Steel Group 
relocated to another city. Similarly, Hyundai’s Chinese operation risks failure without the 
cooperation of its Chinese partner.58 As such, even though both sides have “different dreams” 
                                                     
54 Interview with a chief researcher at Samsung Economic Research Institute 15 (May 11, 2009); Interview with a 
former manager at Hyundai’s Beijing office and current manager at Korean office  (December 18 2009).  
55 In 2007, the leader in the market of Shanghai GM sold 500,000 cars with total sale of seven billion RMB, which is 
10% of total sales amount. On the other hand, BHMC reaped only 4% of revenue of one billion RMB with 230,000 
sales (Korean Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade, 2008). 
56 Interview with a company spokesman, Hyundai motor headquarter in Seoul, Korea (December 2, 2010).  
57 It is a JV between BAIHC (60%) and Beijing Industrial Development Investment Management Company (40%) 
with a registered capital of one billion RMB. 
58 Interview with a former manager at Hyundai’s Beijing office and current manager at Korean office  (December 
18, 2009).  
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about the role of JVs in developing Chinese indigenous suppliers, JV ownership requirements in 
the auto operations make them have no other choice but to maintain the partnership in BHMC.  
 
Figure 4. Fragmented Liberalisation and BHMC 
 What has not changed?  
Local Protectionism and Taxi 
What has changed?  
Local Content and Suppliers 
WTO 
level 
TRIMs’ limitations on intra-national 
barriers and local protectionism 
TRIMs’ prohibition of local content 
requirements 




Various legal provisions against local 
protectionism 





Continued local protectionism 
Non-tariff barriers at the sub-national 
level 
Adopting liberalising measures to enable 
Hyundai’s supplier transplant  




BHMC’s extraordinary rise was possible because the Beijing municipal government utilised 
fragmented liberalisation—selectively adopting both protectionist and liberalising measures to 
favour its local JV with Hyundai. At the micro-level, the failure of the Beijing’s previous JV 
with AMC and the threat of a merger between BHMC and with FAW created sufficient political 
urgency for Beijing municipal leaders to guard their own SOE. This urgency prompted the 
Beijing government and the BAIHC to leverage public policy to ensure favourable market 
conditions for Hyundai. At the macro-level, China’s entry into the WTO bestowed new 
autonomy on the Beijing municipal government—not only to adopt local protectionist policies in 
government procurement, but also to provide Hyundai with huge leeway to bring its own 
supplier networks into China. 
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On the local protectionism front, the Beijing municipal government used its control of 
taxi companies to create demand for Hyundai cars. It was able to circumvent the central 
government’s effort to create an integrated market in the automotive sector, and to navigate 
through the limits of WTO rules that only control inter-national barriers and not intra-national 
barriers. The continued practice of local protectionism demonstrates what has not changed since 
China’s entry into the WTO and what kinds of developmental strategies are available to sub-
national governments in a global economy. 
In terms of developing local suppliers, the BAIHC has relied heavily on Hyundai’s 
supplier network in order to expedite Hyundai’s adjustment to China and the revival of the 
automotive industry in Beijing. Empowered by the WTO rules that prohibit local content 
requirements, Beijing was able to allow the full transplanting of Hyundai’s Korean suppliers 
without receiving much political criticism for failing to nurture indigenous companies. This 
strategy coincided well with Hyundai’s ability to draw on its existing relationships with suppliers. 
The unexpected increase in the localisation rate of Hyundai’s part production in China, despite 
the removal of local content requirements, proves that WTO membership has affected China, but 
in a counterintuitive way. The BHMC case study also demonstrates that multinational 
corporations are not, as many scholars have assumed, necessarily the main drivers of 
liberalisation in China. In fact, foreign partners within sub-national joint ventures foster 
fragmented liberalisation in the country.  
The implications of this research extend beyond the sectoral scope of the automotive 
industry and the national boundaries of China. The automotive sector served as an ideal case to 
evaluate the developmental path of emerging economies, the role of the state in transforming a 
country’s industrial structure, and the economic integration of local entities into global 
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production networks.59 First, the BHMC case study exemplifies how China promoted a local 
industry sector while inviting FDI into different regions. This developmental path is situated 
between Mexico’s total reliance on FDI and subsequent “dependent development,” and Japan 
and Korea’s relative closure to FDI-oriented development. 60  Thus, the automotive sector 
provides unique insight as to China’s developmental path, with its emphasis on non-market 
factors and political influences at the sub-national level. Second, the case study reveals the 
impact of external actors on China’s domestic economic development from the host country 
perspective and the impact of foreign corporations in JV with governments at various levels. 
China’s regulations regarding automotive industry ownership force foreign automakers to embed 
themselves into the country’s existing configuration of industrial and government institutions. 
And different FDI’s national origin and particular conditions of sub-national governments 
display different dynamics. As such, this BHMC case study demonstrates what operational 
strategies are available in emerging economies and how they interact with the power and 
authority of the FDI recipient. Lastly, by explaining the delicate interplay of rules at the 
international, national, and sub-national levels, this study highlights how WTO rules have 
perversely granted China’s sub-national governments greater autonomy in engaging in subtle 
anti-competitive practices at the regional level. In a decentralised and fragmented market like 
China, sub-national level compliance explains the course of liberalisation better than national-
level compliance. 
                                                     
59 For Chinese developmental path of investing FDI and its impact on the economic development, please see David 
Zweig, Internationalizing China: Domestic Interests and Global Linkages (Ithaca and London: Cornell University 
Press, 2002) and M. Xia, The Dual Developmental State: Development Strategy and Institutional Arrangements for 
China’s Transition (Brookfield, Vermont: Ashgate, 2000). 
60 For dependent development, see Peter Evans, Development: The Alliance of Multinationals, State, and Local 
Capital in Brazil (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 14-34; R. Kronish  and K.S. Mericle, The 
Political Economy of the Latin American Motor Vehicle Industry (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1984); Gabriel 
Palma, “Three and a Half Cycles of Mania, Panic, and [asymmetric] Crash: East Asia and Latin America 
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